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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
COUNTY OF NEW YORK 
 
In the matter of the Application of HEIDI’S INC.,  
 
  
                                                       Petitioner,  
 
For an Order pursuant to Section 3102(c) of the Civil 
Practice Law and Rules to compel disclosure pre-
action from, 
 
-against- 
 
GOOGLE, INC. and/or its subsidiary, 
PLUS.GOOGLE.COM 
 
                                                       Respondents,  
 
of the identity the defendants JOHN DOE and/or 
JANE DOE, using the screen name “ARNOLD 
ZIFFLEL,” being unknown to the petitioner, in an 
action about to be commenced. 
   
AFFIRMATION IN SUPPORT OF 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
COMPELLING DISCLOSURE OF 
IDENTITY OF ANONYMOUS 
COMMENTER  
  
   
Index No.  
  
 
 
 
DANIEL S. SZALKIEWICZ, ESQ., an attorney duly admitted to practice in the Courts 
of the State of New York, affirms the following statements to be true under the penalties of 
perjury, pursuant to Rule 2160 of the CPLR: 
1. I am a member of the DANIEL SZALKIEWICZ & ASSOCIATES, P.C., the 
attorneys of record for the Petitioner, HEIDI’S INC., (hereinafter “Heidi’s Inn”), in this matter. 
2. I am fully familiar with the facts and circumstances of this matter from my firm’s 
file on this matter kept in the ordinary course of business and from information provided by our 
client, Heidi’s Inn. 
FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 11/25/2013 INDEX NO. 160973/2013
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/25/2013
 2 
3. I submit this affirmation in support of Petitioners application for an order, 
pursuant to CPLR 3102(c), for pre-action disclosure, compelling Google, Inc. and/or its 
subsidiary Plus.Google.Com (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Google”) to disclosure the 
identity of the person or persons (hereinafter the “Reviewer”) who posted a defamatory 
statement about Heidi’s Inn on a website under the operation and control of Google. 
4. Briefly, the application should be granted because the unknown defendants 
created a defamatory review entitled “Heidi’s Inn” at the uniform resource locator (“URL”) 
https://plus.google.com/u/0/104703725442367129039/reviews?hl=en&gl=us, containing 
commentary solely about Heidi’s Inn and included defamatory statements concerning criminal 
activity, drug usage, police incidents, health violations, and other dishonest conduct. The review 
constitutes defamation per se in that it obviously done to damage the corporation’s professional 
reputation.  When the review was posted, of the 11 reviews on line, it appeared first.  
Additionally, when you searched “Heidi’s Inn” on Google, of the 341,000 search results, the 
review appears on the first result. A copy of the review is annexed hereto as Exhibit “A”.  
5. Google will not disclosure the identifying information of the user as it would 
violate its privacy policy.  However, Google has indicated that it would comply with an order 
directing it to furnish identifying information about the person or persons who posted the 
remarks that defamed Heidi’s Inn.  
6. In this affirmation and the annexed affidavit of Sean Diggin, a representative of 
Heidi’s Inn, we have set forth facts sufficient for this Court to compel Google to disclose the 
identity of the anonymous reviewer who posted defamatory statements and other commentary 
on Google’s website. It is respectfully submitted and will be demonstrated below that this 
application should be granted in all respects and result in an order requiring Google to disclose 
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the reviewer’s name(s), address(es), email address(es), phone number(s), IP Address(es) and 
any other information that it may possess that would assist in ascertaining the reviewer’s 
identity. 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
7. New York's CPLR 3201(c) allows a potential plaintiff to seek discovery before 
the commencement of an action:  
Before an action is commenced, disclosure to aid in 
bringing an action, to preserve information or to aid in 
arbitration may be obtained but only by court order.  
 
(CPLR 3102 [c] [McKinney 2007]; see also Admission Consultants, Inc. v. 
Google. Inc., [N.Y. Cty. Index No. 115190/07, Cahn, J.]) 
8. A request for pre-action disclosure is best sought by the commencement of a 
special proceeding (See CPLR 3102[c], Commentary C3102:6 [2007]; see also Daly v. 26-28 
Market St., Inc., 21 A.D.3d 853, 801 N.Y.S.2d 596 [1st Dept 2005]). New York Courts 
routinely grant pre-action disclosure under CPLR 3102(c) to ascertain the identity of a 
defendant to aid in bringing an action (See, e.g., Alexander v. Spanierman Gallery, LLC, 33 
A.D.3d 411, 822 N.Y.S.2d 506 [1st Dept 2006]; Toal v. Staten Island University Hospital, 300 
A.D.2d 592, 752 N.Y.S.2d 372 [2d Dept 2002]; Perez v. New York City Health and Hasp. 
Corp., 84 A.D.2d 789, 44 N.Y.S.2d 23 [2d Dept 1981]). 
9. In order to be entitled to this relief, however, “the moving party must first show 
that it has a meritorious cause of action and that the information being sought is material and 
necessary to the actionable wrong.” (Liberty Imports. Inc. v. Bourguet. et al., 146 A.D.2d 535, 
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536 [1st Dept. 1989]; see also In the Matter of Greenbaum v. Google. Inc., 18 Misc. 3d 185,188 
[Sup. Ct. N.Y.C. 2007]).  
 
PETITIONER HAS ESTABLISHED A LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS 
BASED ON DEFENDANTS’ DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS THAT CONSTITUTE 
LIBEL PER SE 
 
10. In order to establish a claim for libel, a Plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) a false 
and defamatory statement of fact; (2) regarding the plaintiff; (3) which is published to a third 
party; and which (4) results in injury to plaintiff” (Cheek v. DeGuzman, 2011 WL 5295026 
[N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co., October 18, 2011].  
A. False and Defamatory Statement of Facts 
11. A statement is defamatory if it “tends to expose the plaintiff to public 
contempt, ridicule, aversion or disgrace, or induce an evil opinion of him in the minds of right-
thinking persons, and to deprive him of their friendly intercourse in society” Mohen v. 
Stepanov, 59 A.D.3d 502 [2d Dept. 2009], citing Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 
N.Y.2d 369 [1977]). When determining whether a statement an expression of opinion or an 
assertion of fact, the “factors to be considered are: (1) whether the specific language in issue has 
a precise meaning which is readily understood; (2) whether the statements are capable of being 
proven true or false; and (3) whether either the full context of the communication in which the 
statement appears or the broader social context and surrounding circumstances are such as to 
signal ... readers or listeners that what is being read or heard is likely to be opinion, not fact” 
(Melius v. Glacken, 2012 WL 1320224 [2d Dept. 2012]).    
12. A Court must determine in the first instance whether the particular publication, 
considered as a whole, is susceptible of a defamatory meaning and whether the publication 
 5 
concerns the plaintiff. “If the contested statements are reasonably susceptible of a defamatory 
connotation, then it becomes the jury's function to say whether that was the sense in which the 
words were likely to be understood by the ordinary and average reader” (Knutt v. Metro Intern., 
S.A., 91 A.D.3d 915 [2d Dept. 2012]). The Court need only examine the contents of the 
statements to confirm that the postings are libelous statements of fact concerning Plaintiff.  
13. The statements which were made in the review unmistakably refer to Petitioner 
as having committed multiple crimes and violations. The Defendants wrote that at Heidi’s Inn 
there have been “many, many instances of prostitution, drug activity, police involved incidents, 
health department violations, assaults, [and] vandalism.” See Plaintiff’s Exhibits “A”. Looking 
at the comments as a whole, the postings undeniably are asserted as fact. These statements are 
unambiguous factual assertions of criminal conduct and injury Petitioner’s business reputation.  
Defendant also asserted as a matter of fact that the owners of the Inn are “dishonest.” The 
“tone” of these defamatory statements are “straightforward and declaratory, and does not appear 
to be intended as a juvenile attempt to achieve humor” (Suarez v. Angelet, 90 A.D.3d 906, 935 
[2d Dept. 2011]).   
14. Petitioner’s representative has sworn to the fact that the allegations in the 
statements are completely untrue. See Diggin’s Affidavit annexed hereto. 
15. The libelous statements clearly tend “to expose the Plaintiff to public contempt, 
ridicule, aversion or disgrace, or induce an evil opinion of him in the minds of right-thinking 
persons, and to deprive him of their friendly intercourse in society” (Mohen, supra).  
B. Publication of the Statements 
16. The libelous statements are published on the review page for Heidi’s Inn.  
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17. By posting the writings on the google website, the reviewer broadcasted the 
defamatory statements on the internet and clearly published and broadcasted the statements to 
many more people than just Petitioner. They were broadcast to anyone who could find the page 
or searched for the phrase “Heidi’s Inn.”  
 
C. Injury to the Plaintiff 
18. Certain statements are considered so egregious by the Courts that they are 
libelous per se. Two categories of libelous per se statements are those that “charg[e]” plaintiff 
with a serious crime” and those that “that tend to injure another in his or her trade, business or 
profession” (Liberman v. Gelstein, 80 N.Y.2d 429 [1992]). When statements are libelous per se, 
the law presumes that damages will result and they need not be separately proved (See DiMilia 
v. Ullman, 2011 WL 1935958 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Putnam Co. 2011). 
19. First, an allegedly defamatory statement may constitute libel per se if it charged 
the defamed person with an indictable crime (Klein v. McGauley, 29 A.D.2d 418, 421 [2d Dept. 
1968]).  “While slanderous language need not consist of the technical words of a criminal 
indictment it is necessary that the language be reasonably susceptible to a connotation of 
criminality” (Caffee v. Arnold, 104 A.D.2d 352, 353 [2d Dept. 1984]). Statements regarding 
serious, as opposed to minor offenses, are actionable as libel per se. Serious crimes such as 
murder, burglary, larceny, fraud, arson, rape, and kidnapping fall within the list of crimes that 
are actionable as libel per se (Liberman, 80 N.Y.2d at 435).  Further, courts have held that 
serious misdemeanors may form the basis for a claim of libel per se  (See, e.g.,  DeFilippo v. 
Xerox Corp., 223 A.D.2d 846, (3rd Dept. 1996).  
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20. Even in its simplest form, allowing prostitution and drug activity in a premises is 
a violation of the New York Penal Law.  In fact, in New York City, such allegations are 
sufficient to have a location declared a “public nuisance” under the law and shut down 
permanently.  Additionally, violations by the health department are both misdemeanors and 
penal law violations. Thus, there is no doubt that the review can be read as imputing crimes on 
Petitioner, and that this crime is sufficiently serious to be actionable as libel per se. 
21. Even more glaring is the fact all the statements by Defendants are intended to, 
and do, defame Petitioner in its trade and are injurious to its profession. “Words which affect a 
person in his or her profession by imputing to him or her any kind of fraud, dishonesty, 
misconduct, or unfitness in conducting one’s profession may be actionable” (Wasserman v. 
Haller, 216 A.D.2d 289 [2d Dept. 1995]; See also Four Star Stage Lighting, Inc. v. Merrick, 56 
A.D.2d 767 [1st Dept. 1977]). More specifically, statements which adversely reflect on the 
integrity and management of a hospitality institution are actionable as libel per se (see 43 N.Y. 
Jur. 2d Defamation and Privacy § 60).  
22. On not less than five occasions the Defendants attack Petitioner’s professional 
character by asserting, as a matter of fact, that Petitioner’s location allows criminal activity, and 
the Petitioner committed acts of fraud, misconduct and dishonesty. As detailed more thoroughly 
in the annexed Affidavit, Petitioner runs a respected institution and is well known in the local 
community. Therefore, the statements constitute libel per se as they go to the heart of 
Petitioner’s livelihood.  
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
23. For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court: (i) 
determine that Petitioner has made the requisite showing pursuant to CPLR §321 02( c) 
concerning the existence of a meritorious cause of action; (ii) order Google to seek to attempt to 
notify the user of these proceedings in the event he or she wants to file an objection; (iii) order 
Google to provide pre-action disclosure to Petitioner respecting the identity of the person(s) 
responsible for the creation of the review, in the event the user does not file and objection; and 
(iv) grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper under the 
circumstances. 
DATED: November 25, 2013 
New York, New York 
DANIEL SZALKIEWICZ & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
By: DanielS. Szalkiewicz, Esq. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
7 Dey Street, Suite 900B 
New York, New York 10007 
Telephone: (212) 706-1007 
Fax: (914) 500-2315 
Daniel@Lawdss.com 
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ATTORNEY'S VERIFICATION 
STATE OF NEW YORK } 
} ss.: 
COUNTY OF NEW YORK } 
DANIEL S. SZALKIEWICZ, ESQ., being duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That I am an attorney duly admitted to practice in the courts ofNew York State, and that 
I am the attorney of records, or of counsel with the attorney(s) of record for the plaintiff(s), I 
have read and know the contents of the annexed ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE, know the 
contents thereof and the same are true to my knowledge, except those matters therein which are 
stated to be alleged on information and belief, and as to those matters I believe then to be true. 
My belief, as to those matters therein not stated upon knowledge, is based upon the following: 
facts, investigation and pertinent information contained in deponent's file. 
The reason I make this affirmation instead of petitioner is because petitioner(s) reside in 
a County other than where the deponent maintains his office. 
Dated: New York, New York 
November 25, 2013 
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DanielS. Szalkiewicz, Esq. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
COUNTY OF BRONX 
In the matter of the Application of HEIDI'S INC., 
Petitioner, 
Index No. 301406/2010 
For an Order pursuant to Section 3102(c) of the Civil Practice Law and Rules to compel 
disclosure pre-action from, 
-against-
GOOGLE, INC. and/or its subsidiary, PLUS.GOOGLE.COM 
Respondents, 
of the identity the defendants JOHN DOE and/or JANE DOE, using the screen name "ARNOLD 
ZIFFLEL," being unknown to the petitioner, in an action about to be commenced. 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
DANIEL SZALKIEWICZ & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
7 Dey Street, Suite 900B 
New York, New York 10007 
(212) 706-1007 
Fax: (914) 500-2315 
Daniel@lawdss. com 
General Information
Court New York Supreme Court, New York County
Docket Number 160973/2013
Status Open
Heidi's Inc. v. Google, Inc., Docket No. 160973/2013 (N.Y. Sup Ct. Nov. 25, 2013), Court Docket
© 2013 Bloomberg Finance L.P. All rights reserved. Terms of Service
View at Bloomberg Law   // PAGE 11
